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03 / analyses · 22 September 2026

After the shot: who reports, to whom, and who pays

Maciej M. Kasperek

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Polish, Czech and Latvian law says who may bring down a drone over critical infrastructure. Less attention goes to what happens a minute later, when someone has to report it and settle who pays for the damage.

The debate on counter-drone law usually ends at the shot. Yet the shot opens a second part of the procedure, as mandatory as the first. Someone has to document the event, notify the right authorities and secure the place where the drone came down. Someone also has to answer the question of who pays for the damage. Poland, Czechia and Latvia solve this in three different ways. This piece describes each of them and does not judge which is better.

Poland: two tracks depending on the means

In Poland, what follows a neutralisation depends on the means used. An employee of a specialised armed security formation may destroy or disable drones under Article 156ze of the Aviation Law. The employee does so with a means of direct coercion within the meaning of the Act on Means of Direct Coercion and Firearms. An amendment of 2025 added devices for destroying or disabling an unmanned aircraft, or taking control of its flight, to the catalogue of such means. The general documentation rules of that act therefore apply, under which every use has to be described in a written note. A destroyed drone is destroyed property, so the note goes to the employee's superior. The use of a firearm has to be reported to the superior without delay. A security employee also reports it to the local police unit. The note is then entered in the register kept by the security company.

Jamming follows another track. Article 6zj of the Crisis Management Act requires the operator of critical infrastructure to declare the devices and their parameters in advance. The declaration goes to the interior minister, who operates the State Secure Communications System. It also goes to the President of the Office of Electronic Communications and to the defence ministry unit responsible for frequency management. The operator informs the same three addressees of every use without delay. The interior minister or the defence minister may order the use stopped or changed. The defence ministry then informs the director of the Government Centre for Security and the competent regional police commander. This route applies only to critical infrastructure. Sites under mandatory protection that matter for defence but lack critical infrastructure status have no such procedure. Their guards may formally neutralise drones but have no basis for jamming, as Grzegorz Matyasik points out.

Article 156ze settles liability for damage directly. Damage resulting from the destruction or disabling of a drone, or from taking control of its flight, is borne by the drone's pilot or operator. The provision makes no exception for a neutralisation that turns out to have been a mistake.

There is a third obligation, so far without practical effect. A critical entity has to report a significant incident within 24 hours. The report goes to the authority for its sector and to the director of the Government Centre for Security. It also goes to the Head of the Internal Security Agency and the competent CSIRT. The first list of critical entities is due within nine months of the act entering into force. The thresholds for a significant incident will be set by a regulation whose draft was published in May 2026. Only that regulation will decide whether a drone intrusion that could have disrupted an essential service meets them.

Czechia: two authorities and the Civil Code

The Czech bill does not distinguish between means, so it provides a single track. The critical infrastructure entity reports the use of the means to the Police of the Czech Republic without undue delay. It reports the breach of the flight ban in the zone to the Civil Aviation Authority. Two events, two addressees. The entity files its procedures and risk assessment in the critical infrastructure portal beforehand. After an incident the authorities therefore know the rules it acted under.

The bill creates no separate liability regime, and the explanatory memorandum refers to the Civil Code. Where the intervention was lawful, damage to the drone results from a risk taken by whoever sent the drone over the protected site. Damage to third parties is borne first by the pilot and then by the drone's operator. Where the intervention was unlawful, the entity that carried it out is liable as well.

Latvia: three addressees and insurance

Since January 2026 the Latvian Security Guard Activities Law has allowed guards at critical infrastructure sites to stop a drone's flight without warning. It also adds duties for the moment after the intervention. The guard must do everything possible to limit the damage and keep other people safe. The guard reports the event without delay to the person responsible for the site's security, to the State Police and to the direct superior. The guard also secures the scene and gives first aid to anyone injured.

Damage to third parties is compensated by the security company, and the same law requires such companies to hold compulsory liability insurance. The Latvian model thus places the burden of damage to third parties on the security company and its insurer.

Comparison

PolandCzechiaLatvia
Who reportssecurity employee (kinetic means), site operator (jamming)critical infrastructure entityguard
To whomsuperior, and the police when a firearm is used (kinetic means); interior ministry, President of the Office of Electronic Communications, defence ministry unit (jamming)Police (use), Civil Aviation Authority (breach of the zone)person responsible for site security, State Police, superior
Deadlinewithout delay for firearms and jammingwithout undue delaywithout delay
Documentation and action at the scenenote under the Act on Means of Direct Coercion, register of the security companyprocedures and risk assessment filed beforehand in the portalsecuring the scene, first aid
Liability for damagedrone's pilot or operatorunder the Civil Code, risk of whoever sent the drone, pilot and then operator for third parties, the entity as well if the intervention was unlawfulsecurity company towards third parties, compulsory liability insurance

The minute after the shot

All three models lead to one point. A counter-drone procedure does not end at the moment of the hit. Who calls whom, who collects the debris, who writes the note and which insurer pays? The operator should know these answers before the first intrusion, not after it. A company protecting sites in more than one of these countries needs three different procedures for the same minute.

Declaration of interest. The author is the founder of Silesian Advanced Systems, a team developing an autonomous counter-drone system ahead of incorporating a company. This gives him a commercial interest in the subject. The text describes the provisions as worded in the sources listed below and does not constitute legal advice.

Sources

  1. Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland. 2026. Draft regulation of the Council of Ministers on the thresholds for recognising an incident as significant. gov.pl, May. ↗
  2. Grozījumi Apsardzes darbības likumā. 2025. Latvijas Vēstnesis, adopted 18 December 2025, in force from 20 January 2026. likumi.lv, id 365606. ↗
  3. Matyasik, Grzegorz. 2026. “Czy obiekty infrastruktury krytycznej są chronione przed dronami?” Instytut Wschodniej Flanki, 27 July. ↗
  4. Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. 2026. Návrh zákona, kterým se mění některé zákony s cílem posílit odolnost subjektů kritické infrastruktury proti bezpilotním systémům, with explanatory memorandum. eKLEP KORNDW7JRL1U, 21 July. ↗
  5. Republic of Poland. 1997. Act of 22 August 1997 on the Protection of Persons and Property, Article 36. ↗
  6. Republic of Poland. 2002. Act of 3 July 2002, Aviation Law, consolidated text Journal of Laws 2025, item 1431, Article 156ze. ↗
  7. Republic of Poland. 2013. Act of 24 May 2013 on Means of Direct Coercion and Firearms, consolidated text Journal of Laws 2026, item 244, Article 12(1)(21), Article 33a and Articles 50–54. ↗
  8. Republic of Poland. 2025. Act of 24 January 2025 amending the Aviation Law and certain other acts. Journal of Laws 2025, item 179. ↗
  9. Republic of Poland. 2026. Act of 29 May 2026 amending the Crisis Management Act and certain other acts. Journal of Laws 2026, item 815, Articles 6zj and 6zv. ↗
  10. Security Guard Activities Law (Apsardzes darbības likums). Official English translation, Valsts valodas centrs. likumi.lv, id 264785, sections 24 and 25. ↗

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